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Abstract— As 802.11 Wireless LAN network is vulnerable to many security attacks, a complicated authentication mechanism was 
developed in IEEE 802.11i to enhance the WLAN network security. Unfortunately, the original 802.11i authentication procedure 
takes some time to complete and it will significantly affect the quality of service offered to mobile users who may handover between 
several access points. The existing pre-authentication scheme can shorten the authentication time remarkably, but it suffers from the 
unnecessary signalling overhead which may be a heavy burden to the network. In this paper, we propose to improve the pre-
authentication mechanism via reducing the signalling overhead. In our scheme, the mobile user will initiate the pre-authentication 
with a neighbouring access point only when he is really approaching that particular access point. Therefore, many unnecessary pre-
authentication signalling overheads can be avoided. Preliminary simulation results show that signalling overhead can be reduced by 
50% while still maintaining short authentication delay.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Security and handover are two key issues in wireless 
local area network (LAN) network. Security is about 
securely delivering data over the open wireless medium, and 
handover is to maintain connection while the mobile users 
are moving from one access point’s coverage area to another 
access point’s.  
With regard to security, problems arise because wireless 
LAN (WLAN) networks use radio wave as the medium to 
exchange data and network traffic can be easily snooped by 
an attacker by simply launching warchalking and wardriving 
attacks. When an attacker can easily capture and modify the 
data, wireless LAN networks will lose their confidentiality, 
integrity and access control and the communication is no 
longer secure. The handover issue arises from limited 
coverage area of access point (AP) which is up to 300 meters 
[1]. This has forced users to handover to keep the connection 
on when moving out of the current AP’s coverage area to a 
new one in the extended service set network, whereby the 
network consists of more than one AP. 
In order to enable secure communication in WLAN, IEEE 
ratified IEEE 802.11i standard in 2004 [2]. This standard 
allows wireless LAN network to have secure communication 
through validation process applied to both the user and the 
device. Validation is conducted through an authentication 
phase and it is expected to be able to provide protection 
against illegal actions carried out by an unauthorized person, 
such as the release of a rogue AP, masquerading, man-in-the 
middle attack (MIMA), message modification, and Denial of 
Service (DoS).  
The IEEE 802.11i defines IEEE 802.1X standard to 
control the right of devices to access the network or 
resources within a network. To provide authentication and 
key generation, IEEE 802.11 relies on Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) mechanism [3]. These two 
standards will produce a number of keys that will be used by 
the user, access point, and authentication server (AS) to 
prove their identity and build a secure communication link.  
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The keys are generated one by one, based on the 
previously generated keys. The first key is a master key 
which is created by AS and user or mobile node (MN) 
separately as a result of the completion of authentication 
message exchange between them. The master key is used to 
generate Pairwise Master Key (PMK) that will be shared 
between AS, MN, and AP [4]. PMK is a root key to generate 
other keys used to secure communications between user and 
AP [3]. The successful PMK is then used to derive the next 
key, called Pair Temporary Key (PTK). Immediately after 
PTK is generated, it is divided into four keys that will be 
used to protect the data from being tampering and protects 
the communication between MN and AP from MIMA attack 
[5]. 
Each time a user wishes to participate in communication 
in network and use its resources such as database and 
internet, user needs to prove that they are the person that 
they claim to be (an authorised person) through 
authentication mechanism. When an enterprise implements 
IEEE 80211i as its authentication mechanism, it requires a 
number of keys to be created and distributed. As a result, the 
authentication phase during handover requires a considerable 
amount of time. In other words, fast handover is not 
supported [6] and multimedia applications suffer due to the 
long delay [7] [8]. 
As mentioned in [9], efficient authentication mechanisms 
are required to support seamless handovers across access 
network boundaries. Therefore, a strong authentication 
mechanism is needed to provide appropriate protection 
against security attack. But the authentication delay should 
be limited to avoid degrading the quality of service offered 
to mobile users performing handover. At the same time, the 
signalling overhead introduced by authentication should also 
be limited. In this paper, we introduce our pre-authentication 
scheme which can achieve all these objectives. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II presents a related work in this area. In Section III 
we explain our proposed scheme. In Section IV we present 
our simulation results. We conclude our paper in Section V. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
A number of researches have been conducted in order to 
shorten authentication time to enable fast handoff. Pack, et 
al, proposed pre-authentication technique in [10] to 
overcome long delay in authentication processes. The basic 
idea is to allow MN and AAA server to exchange some 
authentication messages in advance, and hence some keys 
can be derived and then distributed to neighboring APs 
before MN handovers (make-before-break). The neighboring 
APs are a set of adjacent APs which is determined by several 
factors such as location of AP and users’ movement pattern. 
The adjacent APs are named the frequent handoff region 
(FHR). 
Link weight was introduced in [10] to determine which 
APs are most likely to be the next AP. The weight between 
APs was determined by the handoff ratio. For example, the 
weight of the link from AP1 and AP2 is the number of 
handoffs from AP1 to AP2 over the time spent by the MN 
with AP1 before handovers to AP2.  
A particular parameter, Weight bound value (D), is used 
to limit the size of FHR. The total link weight of the APs 
included in the FHR should not be greater than D. The main 
issue in this scheme is how to choose D.  When the value of 
D is high, the mobile user must perform the pre-
authentication with a number of APs as the FHR will be big 
and hence signaling overhead will be heavy; however, if D is 
chosen to small, the next AP may not be included in the 
FHR and then the full authentication must be conducted 
when the mobile user handoffs which leads to long 
authentication delay. 
The other pre-authentication scheme is introduced by 
Mishra, et al in [11]. They proposed Proactive Key 
Distribution (PKD) to distribute Pairwise Master Key (PMK) 
in advance to the nominated AP(s) listed in Neighbour 
Graph (NG). This method successfully reduced the average 
authentication delay from 1.1 sec to 50 ms. 
There are two ways to generate the NG: it can be 
generated through a re-association request from MN to new 
AP which specifies the previous AP; or, it can be generated 
through move-notify message from current AP to the 
previous AP using Inter Access Point Protocol (IAAP). 
PKD scheme modified the derivation of PMK, which was 
originally using the following equation:  
 
 
ܲܯܭ = ܶܮܵ − ܴܲܨ(ܯܭ," ݈ܿ݅݁݊ݐ ܧܣܲ ݁݊ܿݎݕ݌ݐ݅݋݊"|                  ݈ܿ݅݁݊ݐܪ݈݈݁݋. ݎܽ݊݀݋݉|ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݎܪ݈݈݁݋. ݎܽ݊݀݋݉ )        (1) 
 
 
The PMK was modified into:  
ܲܯܭ௡ = ܶܮܵ − ܴܲܨ(ܯܭ,ܲܯܭ௡ିଵ |ܣܲ_ܯܣܥ| ܯܵ_ܯܣܥ)   (2) 
 
Where,  
n = nth re-association  
ܲܯܭ݊-1 = previous PMK distribution 
 
When AS sends request to the candidate APs about a 
particular MN that launches a request to communicate with 
them, the neighbor APs can ignore or accept the request by 
sending a notification response. If the APs choose to grant 
the request, AS will send an access accept packet containing 
PMKn to target AP. Then the AS notifies MN by sending it 
the list of APs that have granted the request. 
Consider topology in fig. 1, where the MN is currently 
associated with AP1. In PKD scheme, AS immediately sends 
PMK to AP1’s neighbors (AP2, AP3, AP4, and AP5). When 
MN does handoff to one of the APs, say AP2, MN only 
needs to perform re-association procedure. Immediately after 
re-association to the new AP is executed, PMK stored in 
AP1’s other neighbours - AP4 and AP5 - will be deleted and 
AS will automatically send new PMKs to AP2’s neighbours 
(AP1, AP6, and AP8) to facilitate seamless handover. 
In fig.1, the mobile user has just done one handover from 
AP1 to AP2. However, many PMKs are automatically 
generated and distributed to many neighbouring APs like the 
ones distributed to AP3, AP4 and AP5 which are not really 
needed. These unnecessary PMK derivation and distribution 
introduces a lot of processing and signalling overhead which 
may be too much if there are many handovers occurred 





overhead and hence improve the overall network 











Fig. 1 Network topology and user’s trajectory 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
The proposed scheme allows AS to send the PMK to 
target AP(s) in advance if and only if MN is approaching the 
target AP(s). We adopt 802.11i’s EAP-TLS for 
authentication as it is considered as one of the strongest 
authentication mechanisms [4], [12] with strong mutual 
cryptography authentication between two end points (MN 
and AS) that can prevent major attack against security.  
When MS approaches boundary of overlapping area 
between neighbouring APs which is called grey area, current 
AP will notify AS by sending accounting notification. Upon 
receiving notification from current AP, AS sends PMK in 
advance to APs related to the overlapping area. The AS will 
first send a request to the targeting AP(s). When AP(s) 
receives this request from the AS, it will reply by sending a 
notify response packet. Then the AS will send an accept 
packet containing PMK to the AP. If MN is static or not 
approaching the overlapping area, pre-authentication 
procedure will be not initiated.  
The PMK keys will be kept for specific period (soft state 
time) by potential AP(s) to allow MN to move to re-
association phase. When the time is over without any 
handover performed by MN to candidate AP, the PMK will 
expire and be deleted by candidate AP. This modification to 
initial EAP mechanism is required in order to allow pre-
authentication to take place. The detail of proposed scheme 










The PMK generation is modified as follows: 
 ܲܯܭ௡
௝ =  ܶܮܵ –  ܴܲܨ (ܯܭ,ܲܯܭ௡ିଵ|݊ܣܲ_ܯܣܥ|ܯܵ_ܯܣܥ)     (3) 
  
Where: 
 j  = potential AP 
 n = nth re-association PMK୬ିଵ  = previous PMK distribution at APj  
 
When MN is approaching the boundary signal overlapping 
with speed (v) and the coverage overlap between AP1 and 
AP2 is c,  AS sends the key before MN cross area of c at 
diameter a (fig. 3) then the time to do pre-authentication  (∆ݐ) 
- sends the PMK -  can be expressed as: 
 
∆ݐ =  ܥܽ
ݒ
                                                                             (4) 
 
Consider the example we used before in fig. 1, the possible 
PMKs which may be distributed to AP1’s neighbouring APs 
are: 
 
AP3:  ܲܯܭଵଵ =  ܶܮܵ –  ܴܲܨ  (ܯܭ,ܲܯܭ௡ିଵ|݊ܣܲ_ܯܣܥ|ܯܵ_ܯܣܥ) 
AP2:  ܲܯܭଵଶ =  ܶܮܵ –  ܴܲܨ (ܯܭ, ܲܯܭ௡ିଵ|݊ܣܲ_ܯܣܥ|ܯܵ_ܯܣܥ) 
AP4:  ܲܯܭଵଷ =  ܶܮܵ –  ܴܲܨ (ܯܭ, ܲܯܭ௡ିଵ|݊ܣܲ_ܯܣܥ|ܯܵ_ܯܣܥ) 
AP5:  ܲܯܭଵସ =  ܶܮܵ –  ܴܲܨ (ܯܭ, ܲܯܭ௡ିଵ|݊ܣܲ_ܯܣܥ|ܯܵ_ܯܣܥ) 
 
After the new AP (nAP) is identified, the MN will conduct 
re-association with the new AP. In this step, MN only needs 
to tell nAP its identity to enable EAP communication to take 
place and to create other keys such as group temporal key 
(GTK) (fig. 4). MN starts re-association to the nAP 
immediately when the signal from the potential AP is 
stronger than the one from the current AP and should be 
completed before MN leaves the coverage area of previous 






Fig.3 Time to do pre-authentication and Re-association 
 
Hence, time to do re-association (rt) should be less than or 
equal to diameter of coverage area b (Db) divided by speed 
movement of MN (v) (fig.3). 
 
∆ݎݐ =  ஽௕
௩
                                    (5)                                   
 
The distributed PMK will be removed automatically 
when one of these two conditions is met: the soft state time 
is finished or MN re-associates to the new AP. This 
mechanism is conducted to ensure malicious MN cannot 
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steal the PMK. Fig. 3 shows the scheme of re-association 
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Fig. 4 Mechanism of re-association 
IV. SIMULATION, RESULT, AND ANALYSIS 
We use ns-2 to evaluate the performance of our scheme. 
IEEE 802.11g is chosen as our network model as it supports 
IEEE 802.11i for security. Each of AP’s coverage area is 
300 meters, overlapping area between APs is 100 meters, 
and 3 channels reusing model is adopted (fig.5). The general 
parameters of simulation are shown as follows: 
 
 
Table 1 General parameter setting 
Parameter Value 
Number of nodes 2 users, 9 APs 
Radio coverage area 300 m 
Topography 600 x 600 m 
User Movement Speed 10 ms 
Power at transmitter  0.281838 
RTS threshold 1000 bytes 
AP’s beacon interval 0.2 
















Fig.5 Channels re-use model 
 
Topology below shows the APs’ physical position and its 
overlapping area and MN’s physical movement from first 
movement until fifth. However, in our simulation, eleven 




















Fig. 6 Network topology and MN’s trajectory 
 
 
Current position of MN 1 is attached to AP0 and sends 
UDP packets to a correspondent. The doted circle is the first 
AP that MN is connected to. The red dot color is the location 
where pre-authentication started to take place, because at 
this point the MN can hear both AP0 and AP1. The green dot 
indicates when pre-authentication should be completed and 
re-association to AP2 should be initiated. After a random 
delay, the MN starts to move through all the areas from 
position 0 (P0) until position 11 (P11) without pause until the 
simulation time is over.   
Based on simulation, MN experiences 16 handovers 
within 11 movements. It happened because for some 
movements, the MN may experience two handovers, due to 
the distance from current positions to the next position 
which is far enough. Consequently, to maintain the 
connection, MN needs to handoff to the closet AP before it 
reaches the designated AP.   
Based on number of handovers, the cost to pre-
authenticate and re-associate can be calculated. The term of 
cost in this paper refers to number of message exchanges 
between network entities: MN, AP, and AS during the 
movements. For each message sent, it has a cost of t. The 
signaling flowchart in our scheme is almost the same as the 
one described in the PKD scheme; the difference is about 
when the signaling is sent and who are involved in the 
signaling. 
We give an example to explain how the total cost is 
calculated. We consider the movement of the MN from 
position P0 to position P1, where the MN handovers from 
AP0 to AP1. At position P0, MN1 is attached to AP0 and 
starts to send UDP packets to its correspondent. At time (t0), 
MN starts to move to position P1, which leads to 
approaching the overlapping area between AP0 and AP1. 
When the MN hears the signal from AP1, AS sends the 
appropriate PMK to AP1 with cost 7t. When the MN finds 
the signal from AP1 is stronger than the one from AP0, the 























is the first association, the cost will be added with full 
authentication which requires 16t. The total cost is 31t. Full 
authentication is only needed when the MN is associated 
with the network first time. The subsequent authentication 
with other APs is achieved via pre-authentication. 
The total cost of each movement for our scheme and for 
PKD scheme is shown in fig. 7. In Fig. 8, we show the 
difference of signaling cost from our scheme and from PKD, 





























Fig. 8 Cost of PMK distribution and re-association at Null 
movement 
 
From fig. 7, it can be seen that the cost of PKD scheme is 
higher than our proposed scheme. This is because each time 
new re-association is executed, the new AP or AS sends the 
PMK immediately to the neighbor APs, for instance a 
movement from P0 to P1. At position 0 – or known as initial 
connection – MN performs full authentication, then AS 
immediately sends the key to AP1 and AP3 which is 
considered as AP0’s neighbor. When MN moves to P1, MN 
is able to re-associate directly to AP1. When re-association 
done, AS sends PMK to AP1’s neighbor (AP0, AP2, and 
AP4). In our proposed scheme, the AS sends the PMK in 
advance only when the key distribution is triggered. Thus, 
this act will save cost and does not keep the AS busy. 
For each movement of 6, 7, 8, and 9, multiple handovers 
occur. Consider The MN movement from P5 to P6, MN first 
pre-authenticates and re-associates with AP5 before finally it 
pre-authenticates and re-associates with AP2. Cost for the 
proposed scheme is only half of the PKD scheme. 
Fig.8 shows the cost when MN does not do any 
movement and keeps its connection to the current AP (AP0). 
The proposed scheme shows that the cost occurs only at the 
initial authentication, the PKD scheme cost is higher because 
AS sends the PMK to NG though MN is static. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 802.11 wireless LAN network is vulnerable to many 
security attacks. Authentication is a promising mechanism to 
enhance security for wireless LAN network. Unfortunately, 
the standardized 802.11i authentication mechanism 
introduces a long delay which may degrade the quality of 
service received by mobile users. Pre-authentication scheme 
like PKD can shorten the authentication delay significantly 
but suffers from heavy unnecessary signalling overhead as it 
requires to pre-authenticate with all neighbouring access 
points. In this paper, we propose to initiate the pre-
authentication only when it is necessary and therefore 
reducing the signalling overhead and still maintains short 
authentication delay. Simulation results show that our 
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